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ARTICLES

JUSTICE BRENNAN: A TRIBUTE TO A FEDERAL
JUDGE WHO BELIEVES IN STATE'S RIGHTS
BY ANN LoUSIN*

In the United States, constitutional law has come to mean almost exclusively the case law interpreting the United States Constitution. Few law schools teach about state constitutions in basic constitutional law courses, let alone offer separate courses on state
constitutions. In the last decade, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in state constitutions. The United States Supreme
Court, lower federal courts, state courts, law schools and even law
review writers have discovered that the fifty state constitutions are
an integral part of both the framework of American government and
the constitutional protection of individual liberties.
Justice William J. Brennan is greatly responsible for this renaissance. Since 1977, when he wrote "State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,"' Justice Brennan has led the fight to
increase the role of state courts and state bills of rights as guardians
of liberties above and beyond those liberties protected by the
United States Constitution. Through his articles, speeches and judicial opinions, he has steadily advanced the view that each state can
and should protect its own citizens to a greater degree than the
United States Constitution does.
In his 1977 article, Justice Brennan observed that by 1969 the
United States Supreme Court had incorporated most of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights into state law. As a result, state courts
found themselves relying upon the federal guarantees and virtually
ignoring their own state bills of rights. This situation changed dur* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Grinnell College;
graduate studies, The University of Heidelberg (Germany); J.D., The University of
Chicago. Professor Lousin was a research assistant for The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention (1969-70) and has written, studied, taught and lectured extensively
in the field of Illinois constitutional law.
The author thanks Harley D. Diamond of the Illinois bar for his research
assistance.
1. 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
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ing the 1970's when the federal courts, particularly the United
States Supreme Court, ceased expanding federal protection. At that
point, some state courts discovered that their own state bills of
rights provided alternative sources of protection of individual liberties. "Equal protection," "due process" and "rights of the accused,"
all federal rights in the decade of the sixties, became state rights
with new and broader meanings than those articulated by the
United States Supreme Court of the seventies.
Justice Brennan "salute[d] this development in our state
courts,"'2 and called upon state courts to fill the gap created by the
retreat of the Supreme Court. He urged them to interpret the federal bill of rights more broadly than the Supreme Court did and to
search their state constitutions for guarantees of individual liberty
superior to, or at least different from, those in the Federal
Constitution.
This one law review article, almost by itself, created the renaissance of state constitutionalism. Its influence can be seen in its frequent appearance in law review citations.- Moreover, Justice Brennan's other writings and speeches have also influenced the current
reassessment of the role of state courts in protecting liberty.4
As Justice Brennan realizes, there are a number of practical obstacles to the successful realization of making state constitutions the
equal partner of the Federal Constitution. The first obstacle is the
changed interpretation of the "adequate and independent state
grounds" doctrine. If a state supreme court bases a decision regarding individual liberty upon state constitutional grounds that are independent of federal constitutional grounds and adequate to sustain
the decision, the federal courts will not entertain an appeal based
upon an argument that the state court had misconstrued the federal
bill of rights. This "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine prevents needless appeals in federal court and protects the integrity of state court decisions based upon state bills of rights.
2.

Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90

HARv. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).

3. It is one of the most frequently cited law review articles of modern times. See
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540 (1985), which
found Brennan's article to be the nineteenth most-frequently-cited law review article
of those published in the last forty years. Brennan's article had amassed a total of 176
law review citations and 112 court opinion citations by that time.
4. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's "Remarks at the New York University School of
Law" (April 15, 1982) (transcript available from the Office of Public Information,
United States Supreme Court). This speech was also mentioned in Collins, Reliance
on State Constitutions:Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 416 n.164 (1984).
See also ABA Speech in New York (August 8, 1986), cited in "State Constitutional
Law," a special section of The National Law Journal, Volume 9, no.3, September 29,
1986, pages S-1 to S-20, at S-1.
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Michigan v. Long6 is the most significant recent United States
Supreme Court case on the role of state constitutions in federal
question appeals. The issue was one of search and seizure, and the
Michigan Supreme Court had decided in favor of the accused on
both state constitutional and federal constitutional grounds. The
Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, reversed on the federal
grounds. Because the state court had not "made clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being
used only for the purposes of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has revealed" 6 , the state court's decision
on the state bill of rights did not constitute an adequate and independent state ground sufficient to preclude a federal appeal.
I am not necessarily a critic of the result in Michigan v. Long. I
think the result will be to compel those state supreme courts honestly considering a state constitutional claim to state a full and cogent analysis of that claim. During the years of expansion of federal
rights, state supreme courts became accustomed to citing only federal decisions even while they were analyzing state constitutional
rights. One former supreme court clerk (not in Illinois) told me that
he was instructed to add a "boilerplate footnote" mentioning, but
not fully discussing, the comparable state constitutional provision
into drafts of opinions certain to be appealed on federal grounds.
His justice hoped, he said, that the boilerplate would provide an adequate and independent state ground for a federal court disinclined
to reverse or even to hear the case. Rarely, however, was this hope
realized.
Presumably Michigan v. Long will discourage "boilerplate"
treatment of state constitutional bills of rights. It is interesting,
however, that the Supreme Court of the 1980's has rediscovered
"state's rights" in such a limited, one might even say peculiar, fashion. While seeming to defer to state constitutions, the Court has increased the burden upon a state supreme court seeking to prove that
it is relying upon the state constitution. As a practical matter, the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine is rarely important
except in questions of individual liberties. The Court, therefore,
makes it more difficult - how much more difficult we do not yet
know - for a state to assert the predominance of its own bill of
rights in deciding a question involving one of its citizens. This is
indeed a strange form of "state's rights."
The second obstacle to the advancement of state constitutions
is the reluctance of many state judges to forego their habit of relying
upon the United States Constitution and virtually ignoring their
5.
6.

463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
Id. at 1041.
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state charters. The California Supreme Court has received great attention - some might even say notoriety - for its willingness to
interpret phrases common to both the United States and California
bills of rights more "liberally" when used in the California charter.7
One reason California receives so much attention, however, is because it is so exceptional. Moreover, there is a strong minority on
the California Supreme Court who oppose this trend; the changes in
the membership of that court caused by the electorate's rejection of
three justices in November, 1986, could reverse this exceptional
view.8
Another way that some states expand the rights of their citizens
is by relying upon the differences in wording - and presumably
therefore also of meaning - between the federal and state provisions. The California Bill of Rights has a particularly large number
of linguistic differences from its federal counterpart, differences that
have provided a foundation for rights of Californians that are independent of federal rights.9 Here again California may well be in the
minority. Many state bills of rights are identical or virtually identical to the federal bill of rights. In those states there is less leeway for
the state supreme court to interpret a clause, for instance, "equal
protection," differently because it appears in the state charter, as
opposed to the federal one.1" Even if the framers of a state constitution have deliberately inserted specific new language to create a separate state right, there is no guarantee that the state supreme court
will view the state right as any different from the federal right. For
example, the 1969-70 Illinois Constitutional Convention created a
specific "right to privacy,"" but the Illinois Supreme Court has
held, in the face of that precise language and the constitutional history, that this is simply the federal right to privacy' and nothing
7. For Justice Brennan's discussion of California's attitude, see, 90 HARV. L.
489, 498-99 (1977) and Note, People v. Pettengill: The Independent State
Ground Debate in California, 67 U. CAMP. L. REV. 768 (1979).
8. Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court and two of her colleagues, Associate Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz Reynoso, were denied retention in office by the California electorate on November 4, 1986. Quite probably their
successors will not seek ways to afford Californians any civil liberties they do not
REV.

already enjoy as United States citizens.
9. See discussion of California cases in Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENVER U. L. REV. 85, 104-05
(1985).
10. Justice Brennan, however, did cite several instances of such different interpretations of equal protection. 90 HARV. L. REV. at 495-96. But see Gibbs v. Estate of
Dolan, 100 Ill Dec. 61, 496 N.E.2d 1126 (1986) (Illinois Appellate Court, relying upon
Illinois Supreme Court decision and secondary authority, held that "the constitutional guarantees of due process are viewed as generally the same under both the
Illinois and federal constitutions.")
11. ILL. CONST. Art. I § 6 (1970).
12. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984) (Illinois
Supreme Court "reject[ed] defendant's contention that State protection ... was in-
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more.
Finally, we should not expect state supreme court justices, who
are frequently deeply - imbedded in the political processes of their
states, to be bolder than their fellow-citizens will allow. While Mr.
Dooley may or may not have been right when he said that the
United States Supreme Court follows the election returns, his observation is certainly true of most state supreme courts. As the 1986
California judicial retention election clearly shows, few justices can
afford the luxury of striking out boldly for rights and liberties beyond the consensus of the justices' constituency.
This is not to say that I consider the future of constitutional
rights in state supreme courts totally bleak. The renewal of interest
in state court views on rights and liberties, limited though it may
prove to be, is still a renaissance."3 While the state courts may not
proceed apace in interpreting the federal constitution more broadly
than the United States Supreme Court does, they may well come to
rely upon separate state constitutional provisions as adequate and
independent grounds for adjudicating rights and liberties in their
states. Unless the United States Supreme Court of the 1990's interprets Michigan v. Long to impose a ridiculously heavy burden upon
state supreme courts,14 these state decisions upon state grounds may
truly become a viable source of constitutional protection.
There may well be more separate state constitutional rights for
the courts to interpret because a number of states are reconsidering
their state constitutional provisions. The Illinois Constitution of
1970, for example, contains several provisions intended to establish
new rights'" above and beyond the federal rights. Even in 1969-70
the members of the convention were sensitive to the role of a state
bill of rights. Future conventions, whether in Illinois or elsewhere,
tended to be more extensive that provided at the Federal level.").
13. "State Constitutional Law," a special section of The National Law Journal,
Volume 9, no.3, September 29, 1986, pages S-1 to S-20contains an excellent recent
discussion of the cases and secondary authorities.
14. For discussions of the effect of Michigan v. Long besides the articles already
mentioned, see Trends in the Law, 72 A.B.A.J. 84 (September 1986); Collins, Plain
Statements: The Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70 A.B.A.J. (March, 1984); and
"State Courts Move Beyond U.S. Bench in Rights Rulings," The New York Times,
May 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1 & at 16, col. 1.
15. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. Art. I, § 17 (1970) (general antidiscrimination provision). For a further discussion of this section, see Gertz, The Unrealized Expectations of Article I, Section 17, 11 J. MARSHALL J. of Practice & Procedure 283 (1978).
Art. I, § 18 (1970) contains a "little E.R.A." designed to prohibit gender discrimination. For a further discussion of this section, see Recent Development, "Sex As A
Suspect Classification under the Illinois Sex Equal Protection Clause," 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 153-66 (Illinois Supreme Court Review). Art. I, Sec. 19 (1970) contains a provision intended to combat discrimination against the handicapped. For a further discussion of this section, see Connor, Recent Development in Employment Discrimination Law, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 323, 340-45 (1982).
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will be even more sensitive to that role, thanks to the recent attention paid to the role of the states in protecting individual liberty.
The road to recognition of state constitutional rights is a long
and treacherous one. Only four years ago, before the peak of the
current interest, Justice Brennan asked the question, "What Can Be
Done?" And he answered with a story. He said
I feel like the mountain climber who slipped from the face of a very
steep mountain. He was falling to what looked like certain death on
the rocks below. At the last minute he was able to grab and hold onto
an outcropping bush. While hanging there, he looked up at the top of
the mountain, and at the top of his voice he desperately yelled: "Is
anybody up there?" There was no answer. "Is anybody up there?
Someone please save me!" After a while, a voice boomed out: "I'm up
here." "Who are you?: The mountain climber asked. "Save me, save
me." "I am the Lord, your God, and I can save you. Do you believe in
me?" The man cried out: "I believe, I believe." The voice replied:
"Then let go of the bush." The man waited a moment, and then
shouted: "Is there anybody else up there?" What can be done? Well, I
ask you. "Is there anybody else up there?"' 7
Obviously, the federal judiciary has not "been there." It has been up
to the state judiciary to help the mountaineer, incomplete as that
help may be. For their help, for the renewal of interest in state

constitutions, we can thank Justice Brennan.

16. Justice Brennan's "Remarks at the New York University School of Law"
(April 15, 1982) (transcript available from the Office of Public Information, United
States Supreme Court).
17. Id.

